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David L. Markell

There

has been considerable emphasis in recent years on
increasing opportunities for citizens to participate in
environmental governance. The United States Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) May 2003 Public Involvement Policy highlights EPA'S commitment to public
involvement and the reasons for the agency's commitment, and
provides general guidance for promoting public participation in
the agency's decision-making processes. U.S. EPA, OFFICE OF
POLICY, ECONOMICS & INNOVATION, PUBLIC INVOLVEMENT
POLICY OFTHE U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY 1

(May 2003). In that document, EPA states that, to achieve its mission,"EPA needs to continue to integrate, in a meaningful way,
the knowledge and opinions of others into its decision-making
processes. Effective public involvement can both improve the
content of the Agency's decisions and enhance the deliberative
process." EPA also has developed guidance to facilitate or promote public participation in specific areas. See U.S. EPA, Interim
Guidance for Community Involvement in Supplemental Environmental Projects, 68 Fed. Reg. 35,884 (une 17,2003).
States have experimented with a wide variety of strategies
to facilitate and encourage public participation as well. For example, NewYork adopted an unusual law for the siting ofpower
plants that requires applicants to establish an "intervenor fund"
of $300,000 that local government officials and interested members of the public can access in order to develop the technical
expertise needed to participate meaningfully in the consideration of permit applications.
In light of the broad range of government initiatives of this
sort, it is no surprise that outside experts have noted that public
participation has "taken center stage" in environmental governance and has gained an "increasing role" in environmuental
policymaking. THOMAS C. BEIEKLE &JERRY CAYFORD,
DEMOCRACY IN PRACTICE: PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN ENvIRONMENTAL DECISIONS

1 (RFF Press 2002).

Traditionally, citizens have participated in the enforcement/compliance reahn in three main ways. First, citizens have
worked directly with regulated parties. "Good Neighbor" agreements and other tools have provided mechanisms for citizens to
learn more about regulated party operations and sometimes to
play a more proactive role in how a facility operates. See, e.g.,
Sanford Lewis & Diane Henkels, Good NeighborAgreements:A Tool
for Environmental and SocialJustice, 23 Soc.JusT. 4 (1996), available
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at www.cpn.org/topics/environment/goodneighbor.htn-.
"Sunshine" laws such as the Freedom of Information Act and,
specific to the environmental arena, theToxics Release Inventory,
have enhanced citizens' capacity to interact meaningfiflly in
Good Neighbor and similar programs, and also to pressure companies to reduce emissions through the compilation of "dirty
dozen" lists and the like.
Second, citizens have worked with regulators to promote
compliance. EPA recently solicited public input on its triennial
national enforcement and compliance priorities for fiscal years
2005 to 2007. 68 Fed. Reg. 68,893-96 (Dec. 10, 2003). EPA's
June 2003 SEPs Community Involvement Policy,68 Fed. Reg.
35,884, is another example of its efforts to engage the public in
the enforcement sphere. States have pursued similar initiatives.
Over the years, NewYork State's Department of Environmental
Conservation, for example, periodically convened an Environmental Enforcement Advisory Committee to review the department's enforcement priorities and to seek input from
interested citizens. On a more resource-specific and/or regulated party-specific basis, citizens sometimes augment government
compliance-promotion and environmental enforcement efforts
by providing monitoring, information, and other types of support. Incident reporting hotlines have facilitated such partnering, and Riverkeepers, Baykeepers, and similar natural
resource-oriented citizens' organizations have played an important role. See Barton Thompson,Jr., The Continuing Innovation of
Citizen Enforcement, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 185 (2000) (touting the
possible value of this type of citizen/government partnership).
Third, citizens can promote compliance by accessing the
court system themselves. The citizen suit provisions that virtually
all of the major federal environmental statutes now include are
the primary legal mechanism citizens have used to initiate legal
action in their capacity as "private attorneys general" against alleged violators, although other vehicles, such as common law
private nuisance actions, sometimes are available as well. In addition, on occasion citizens have sought to use the citizen suit provisions in the federal environmental statutes to require
governments to pursue enforcement actions against alleged violators, although the courts generally have not been particularly
receptive, as reflected by the Supreme Court's decision in Heckler
v.Chaney,470 U.S. 821 (1985).
A final point about the breadth of citizen opportunities to
participate in environmental governance is that the three types listed above are by no means entirely independent of one another or
mutually exclusive. As political scientistJohn Scholz and others
have noted, new forms of governance are continually evolving, including the creation ofinformal and formal networks that may in-

dude citizens, regulators, and regulated parties in various configurations and that operate on a number of levels for the purpose of
promoting compliance and enhancing environmental protection.
Despite these opportunities for public involvement in the
enforcement/compliance arena, many environmental nongovernmental organizations (ENGOs) are dissatisfied with the
mechanisms that are currently available for citizens who want to
remedy perceived inadequacies in compliance or in government
enforcement-/compliance-related efforts. This dissatisfaction extends more generally to the current state of environmental enforcement and compliance. It includes concerns about the level
of compliance (or significant noncompliance, depending on one's
perspective) with environmental requirements, the pace and quality of government enforcement efforts, and the accountability
of government and regulated parties for their performance.
See generally CLIFFORD R.ECHTSCHAFFEN & DAVID L. MARKELL,

R.EINVENTING ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT &THE
STATE/FEDERAL RELATIONSHIP (Environmental Law Institute
2003). Professor and citizens' advocate James May,for example,
suggests in a recent article that "owing principally to a precipitous
decline in government enforcement ...
since 1995,... citizen suits
matter now more than ever" but that "statutory shortcomings
coupled with judicial ambivalence makes for tough sledding for
environmental citizen suit enthusiasts." James R. May, Now More
Than Ever: Trends in Environmental Citizen Suits, 10 WID. L. REv.
1,4 (2003).
This article offers a short primer on a strategy for environmental governance already in use that holds promise for responding to several of these concerns, including increasing citizens'
opportunities to participate in environmental governance in the
enforcement/compfiance arena; and promoting government accountability, more effective government enforcement, and improved compliance. The mechanism is the citizen submissions
process, which is administered by the North American Commission for Environmental Cooperation (CEC)--the creation of the
environmental side agreement to the North American FreeTrade
Agreement (NAFTA), referred to as the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC). The CEC's
citizen submissions process empowers citizens of any North
American country to file a submission alleging that any of the
countries is"failing to effectively enforce its environmental law."
While this mechanism is not, by itself, a panacea for citizens' concerns, the institutional design of this process, as well as its implementation, may be useful for those interested in exploring
creative ways to increase citizens' roles in the enforcement arena
and in exploring strategies to increase government accountability,
improve government enforcement, and enhance regulated party
compliance. In fact, the mechanism was designed specifically to
further these ends.
A Brief Primeron CEC
The recent ten-year birthday of CEC, the first institution
created in North America to preserve and enhance the continent's environment, makes it an opportune time to consider its
possible value as a model for environmental governance. CEC

owes its existence primarily to the leverage exerted during the
NAFTA negotiations by ENGOs who were concerned about
the impact that NAFTA-stimulated increases in trade might have
on the environment and the possibility that NAFTA's reduction
of trade barriers would precipitate a "race to the bottom" in
which countries reduce environmental protection efforts to lure
development. To attract environmental support for NAFTA in
the United States and thereby increase prospects for NAFTA's
adoption, the three North American countries--the United
States, Canada, and Mexico--agreed to enter into an environmental agreement that would create a new regional environmental institution (GEC) that would be charged with protecting
and improving the North American environment.
The CEC citizen submissions process represents a real-world
experiment in bolstering opportunities for public involvement in
environmental governance in the enforcement/compliance arena.
Several commentators have characterized the process as "the most
innovative" feature of CEC. See, e.g., International Environmental
Law Project, Comments on Issues Relating to Articles 14 & 15 of the
NorthAmerican Commission on Environmental Cooperation(submitted
Oct. 2,2003), available at www.cec.org/files/pdf/jpac/ielpcommentsen.pdf. The process gives citizens an opportunity to
engage government in a way that does not exist domestically
through the filing ofa written submission to the CEC secretariat.
The citizen submissions process lets citizens: identify areas of enforcement they believe are lacking, engage government in a formal
dialogue about their concerns; and enlist the resources, authority,
and credibility of an independent body, the CEC secretariat,
which is charged with pursuing detailed investigations of government enforcement practices that citizens identify as being of concern when the environmental stakes are high enough to warrant it
and with disseminating the information it uncovers about these allegedly ineffective practices throughout the continent and beyond.
(The CEC web page, www.cec.org, contains the ground rules for
filing a submission.)
As noted earlier, Heckler v Chaney and other judicial decisions
have limited citizens' rights to use the court system to influence
government decisions about enforcement. Other domestic
mechanisms potentially may be of use, such as the right to petition EPA to withdraw a state progran delegation on the ground
that the state is failing to fulfill its obligations to enforce the environmental laws effectively, but these have seen limited use and
they have been of even more limited effect. Sinilarly, there are
significant, obvious differences between the CEC process and
EPA-administered processes that are intended to give the public
various types of entry into EPA's decision-making processes.
Two basic features of the citizen submissions process make it
particularly interesting as a possible strategy for enhancing citizens'
roles in environmental governance. First, it is launched by citizens,
hence its name. Citizens can initiate this international process intended to focus on alleged domestic failures to effectively enforce
environmental laws by filing a submission in which they identify
domestic environmental laws that the citizens believe are not being
effectively enforced. While citizens must overcome certain barriers to bring a submission, and while some submitters and others
assert that the countries have raised the bar for filing successful submissions in recent years, a key feature of the process is that, as is the
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case for citizen suits, the citizens set the agenda for the action that
follows by identifying the actors and enforcement-/compliancerelated practices or policies that should be scrutinized. At least in
many instances, it should be easier for citizens to launch this
process than it is for citizens to initiate a citizen suit under the federal environmental laws. CEC has been quite clear, for example,
that a citizen of one of the three countries need not satisfy domestic U.S. standing principles in order to be able to invoke the jurisdiction of the citizen submissions process. See David Markell, The
Commissionfor Environmental Cooperation's Citizen Submission
Process, 12 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. R.V. 545,560-561 (2000).
Second, citizens can spur investigative efforts by others to
learn more about allegedly ineffective government enforcement
practices. CEC's secretariat, based in Montreal, is responsible for
adninistering much of the citizen submissions process and is empowered to: request the country that is the focus of a submission
to respond to allegations of ineffective enforcement (in all cases to
date the country involved has provided a formal response when
asked to do so); recommend, based on the submission and any
country response, development of a "factual record" (or detailed
investigatory report) concerning the alleged failures to effectively
enforce; and develop a factual record if so directed by the CEC
Council, which is comprised of the EPA administrator and his
Canadian and Mexican counterparts. In developing such a
record, the secretariat may consider information that any of the
countries provides. In addition, the secretariat may consider information that ispublicly available; submitted by interested
NGOs or persons; submitted by CEC's Joint Public Advisory
Committee (abody offifteen members of the public, five from
each country, whose role is to interact with the public and to provide advice to the Council); developed by independent experts;
and that it develops itself. Thus, once citizens file a complaint
concerning alleged failures to effectively enforce and the secretariat deems the complaint adequate, extensive effort is invested
by the country involved and by the secretariat to develop information about the enforcement practices at issue. While citizens
may participate in and contribute information to this process as
part of the development of a factual record, considerable information that might be of substantial interest and value to citizens is
likely to be developed or furnished by others. To borrow from
the social science literature, the mechanism is a form of'fire
alarm" that citizens may pull to trigger a more complete response.
See, e.g., Kal Raustiala, Citizen Submissions and Treaty Review' inthe
NAAEC, in GREENING NAFTA:THE NORTH AMERICAN COMMISSION FOp ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION (David Markell &
John Knox eds., Stanford Univ. Press 2003).
Inshort, the CEC citizen submissions process offers citizens
a chance to engage their government (or any other North American government) about potentially ineffective government enforcement in a way that does not exist now. Further,the process
enables citizens to leverage their resources by investing in the
CEC secretariat the authority and resources necessary to conduct
detailed investigations of citizen allegations and to issue reports
with the information the secretariat has uncovered. Because of its
design and focus, the process has the additional benefit of potentially addressing concerns that ENGOs and others have raised
about government accountability, government enforcement, and
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the extent of noncompliance with the law. While the process
lacks coercive remedial or punitive authorities, its engagement of
government in a public process that focuses on allegedly ineffective enforcement practices creates incentives for government to
justify its enforcement priorities and practices to the public in a
way that, ideally, will cause the involved government to reassess its
approaches and consider possible improvements that are identified
through the process. At a minimum, the process provides input
for government decision-makers that might not be available to
them otherwise, and it provides a mechanism for a
government-citizen "dialogue" that otherwise might not occur.
There is much to be said for the benefits that potentially could
flow from these exchanges.
It is important to identify some of the more obvious qualifications on the enthusiasm for considering, and perhaps adopting
domestically, a strategy that to some degree is based on the design
of the CEC citizen submissions process. First, there have been
substantial shortcomings in the track record of the CEC process to
date. While there have been many statements of support for the
process and for the value it has added to domestic governance in
the three countries, a chorus of voices has actively and persistently
criticized the countries for their management of this process. In
fact, CEC's own citizen advisory bodyJPAC, claims that the council is"intervening in the [citizen submission process's] fact-finding
process:' and thereby "undermining the independence of the Secretariat and the credibility of the process" North American
Comm'n for Envd. Cooperation, Advice to Council No: 03-05
(approved Dec. 17,2003), available at www.cec.org/files/pdf/jpac/
advice03-05__en.pdf. The Washington Post, on the eve of CEC's
annual meeting inJune 2000, published an editorial entitled
"How toWreckTrade" in which it criticized the countries for
overstepping their authority in the implementation of the
process. One citizens' group, which was involved in the most recent major submission involving the United States, registered its
dissatisfaction with the countries' performance in administering
the citizen submissions process in comments provided to CEC in
October 2003, in which the citizens criticized the council's
"seeming inability to allow the process to mature and flourish."
The citizens' group continued:
We are not crying wolf. Groups such as the IELP,who have
sought to use the Citizen Submission Process in a balanced

and fair way to examine government conduct in the
[North American] region, will simply turn away from the
process once and for all if Council does not respect the roles
and boundaries so clearly articulated in the NAAEC.
International Environmental Law Project, Comments on Issues
Relating to Articles 14 & 15 of the North American Commission on
Environmental Cooperation (submitted Oct. 2, 2003), available at
www.cec.org/files/pdf/jpac/ielp-commentsen.pdf.
Thus, there is evidence of considerable dysfunction in the
actual operation ofthe process that at least potentially raises significant questions for its future viability or its value as a model. The
record in filing submissions is cause for concern as well. During
the early years of the process, eight of the first twenty-eight submissions filed involved the United States, nine focused on Canada, and eleven targeted Mexican enforcement practices. More

recently, however, not one of the fourteen submissions filed since
2000 focused on the United States enforcement practices.
The fact that a critical review of the track record of an innovative governance strategy yields some successes accompanied
by growing pains should, of course, not necessarily lead to tossing
the initiative (and the model of governance that it represents) on
the "garbage heap" of unworthy approaches. An essential component of any effort to consider innovative institutional designs
and their implementation is to identify weaknesses and evaluate
their significance vis-i-vis the potential benefits of experimenting with such approaches. Another key element ofsuch appraisals involves whether there are ways to refine innovative
approaches so that they are more likely to produce desired results. Such reviews might well lead to judgments to transplant a
pilot strategy despite its limitations because the benefits on balance make it worthwhile, or to try out the model in a different
context with new or different features that are intended to increase successes and reduce shortcomings.
For example, in addition to considering how much independence a secretariat-type entity should have from the government(s) involved, potential weaknesses in the CEC process
include the lack of accepted benchmarks for evaluating government enforcement performance and the lack offollow-up to the
process. Concerning the former, the purpose of the citizen submissions process is to provide information on a country's enforcement priorities and practices so that the public can reach
conclusions about the effectiveness of such practices. It might be
useful to develop general benchmarks for assessing effectiveness so
that the public would have some context for the enforcement
practice-specific information contained in each report. Concerning the latter, once CEC issues its report for a particular submission,there is no obligation for the country involved to followup,
even to the extent of explaining what it plans to do to address the
concerns identified in the report, if any. There sin-ilarly is no provision for CEC to monitor and apprise the public of any such follow-up, and there is no provision for CEC or any other
institution to engage (or consider engaging) in capacity-building
that might improve the enforcement priorities or practices that
are at issue. Revisiting the relationship of government(s) with the
investigatory body,in tandem with creation of performance
measures and of a meaningful monitoring capacity, might yield
significant increases in the effectiveness of a citizen submissionstype process, including a dramatic increase in citizen enthusiasm
and a substantially greater contribution to increasing government
accountability and other objectives.
Another significant issue involves the implicit premises of this
article, notably that there may be some merit to the goals of increasing citizen involvement in enforcement, enhancing governmient accountability, strengthening enforcement, and improving
compliance. None of these premises is unassailable, particularly if
unbounded. For example, in the popular literature, some authors
contend that too much democracy can be "too much of a good
thing" and overwhelm liberty interests. See Fareed Zakaria, THE
FUTURE OF FREEIX)M: ILLIBERAL DEMocRACY AT HOME AND

ABROAD (WW Norton & Co. 2003). In the academic realm, ProfessorJim Rossi challenges various aspects of citizen participation
in governance in his article, ParticipationRun Amok: The Costs of

Mass PartiaipationforDeliberativeAgency Decisionmalng,92 Nw U.L.
REV. 173 (1997), in which he suggests that public participation
may,at times, be counterproductive. For example, according to
Professor Rossi, citizen participation may impair agency agendasetting, and, perhaps paradoxically, affording citizens increased opportunities to participate in governance has coincided in a decline
in citizens' confidence in government. Other commentators have
highlighted fumdamental issues concerning the accountability of
NGOs, including ENGOs, and the importance ofrequiring
greater accountability in tandem with allowing greater roles.
Leading scholars have noted that "optimum" levels of compliance
are subject to debate. See Daniel A. Farber, Taking Slippage Seriously:
Non-Compliance and Creative Compliance in EnvironmentalLaw, 23
HAv.ENvL. L REv. 297,316-17 (1999). Thus, an essential feature of thorough consideration of innovative strategies, such as the
CEC citizen submissions process, needs to be attention to the underlying policy objectives and to the question of how best to design strategies that will maximize the likelihood of achieving
desired results and avoiding undesirable consequences.
To come full circle, government bodies, including our environmental agencies, increasingly tout the related themes of
increased citizen participation in governance and greater accountability in government. This is not surprising since civil
society itself is "demanding" a greater role and greater accountability. Many scholars have joined this chorus as well.
There clearly are risks inherent in such approaches to governance. Nevertheless, the design of the CEC citizen submissions
process and the experience with its implementation may be a sign
of things to come. The CEC process is an example of,and a specific experiment in the use of,what Professor Lester Salamon has
termed the "new governance" in his book, THE TooLs OF GovERNMENr: A GUIDE TO THE NEW GOVERNANCE (Lester M. Salamon ed., Oxford Univ..Press 2003). Professor Salamon suggests
that "the defining characteristics of many of the most widely
used, and most rapidly expanding, tools [of governance] is their
indirect character, their establishment of interdependencies between public agencies and a host of third-party actors." He further suggests that, as a result,"government gains important allies
but loses the ability to exert complete control over the operation
of its own programs." The CEC model possesses these characteristics and its experience is, among other things, evidence of the
growing pains associated with experimenting with new approaches and relationships, including, to some degree, a loss of
government control. The fact that this experiment is occurring
on an international level with potentially significant implications
for domestic governance likely is contributing to the substantial
nature ofthe growing pains it has produced.
Personal experience with CEC has convinced me that there
is potentially much promise in experimenting with these structures of new governance, including innovative approaches for
public problem-solving that give citizens a substantial voice and
that are intended to expand government accountability for its
performance. The CEC model is one that domestic policy-makers and others interested in the shape and content of domestic
governance should know about, and think about, as we consider
how best to build on these experiments to adapt our system of
environmental governance for the future.
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